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Summary
Conjectures regarding portraits of the Fool as performative hyper-icons in the
picaresque tradition initiate an investigation of canny performances of duplicity in
pictures on display. The focus falls on performances of unexpected convolutions
acted out by spectators while looking repeatedly at deceptive pictures. The emphasis
is on the role of the eye in visual shaping and in iterated performance of rhetorical
roles and on recurrent ocular motifs as typiconic features in the picaresque tradition.
’n Oog vir ’n oog: oogmotiewe en pikareske voorstellings
in prente
Besinning oor Narreportrette as performatiewe hiperikone in die pikareske tradisie
dien as prikkel van hierdie ondersoek na geslepenheid en valsheid in prente. Die
fokus val op toeskouers wat opnuut en by herhaling bedrieglike voorstellings aan-
skou. Klem word gelê op die aandeel van die oog in die visuele vormgewing en her-
haalde uitvoering van retoriese rolle en op herhalende oogmotiewe as tipikoniese
kenmerke in die pikareske tradisie.
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The previous focus of my inquiries into imago rhetoric was thepicturing of urban environments in the scenic tradition.1 Atissue were the visual rhetoric of prospector and sightseer roles
(the panoptic power of surveillance and aposcopic vision as a means
of adapting to it) as well as the scenic tradition’s cybernetically based
influence on digitalised imaging in popular visual culture and in
cyberspace.2 Stimulated by Suzanne Human’s recent doctoral disser-
tation on “The picaresque tradition: feminism and ideology critique”
(1999), my attention has shifted towards another typiconic tradition
with a long history of involvement in popular visual culture.
The picaresque tradition is associated with image powers of
mockery and ridicule.3 Typically, this visual rhetoric has the effect of
typecasting the artist and spectator positions in certain roles —
seemingly inexhaustible variations on the characters of the trickster
rogue4 and his or her accomplice5 or dupe.6 Pivotal in the rise of the
picaresque tradition, the figure of the Fool is the metaphorical “turn-
ing point” of the subversive and transgressive powers of mockery and
ridicule. The character of this figure emerges in mixed roles — typi-
cally those of the comic jester, the cruel trickster and the monstrous
grotesque — displayed for instance in a group of pictures in the early
modern genre of so-called Fool’s portraits.7 The likeness of the Fool
is sketched with typical rather than individual traits, a common stra-
1 This is an expanded version of a short paper on the envisagement potential of
ocular motifs in pictures, presented at the fifteenth annual conference of the
South African Association of Art Historians held at the University of Natal,
Pietermaritzburg, from 24 to 26 September 1999.
2 Van den Berg 1997, 1998 & 1999.
3 See Van den Berg 1996: 18-23 for the general framework and some initial
conjectures in this regard.
4 “Trickster” includes the various roles of the rogue, picaro, jester, comedian,
conjurer, fortune-teller, clown, humorist, joker, satirist, caricaturist, lampooner,
parodist, gamester, conman or dissembler.
5 “Accomplice” includes various roles of collusion which in effect turn bystanders
into insiders, and onlookers into connivers.
6 “Dupe” suggests the various roles of the figure of fun, the victim, loser, butt,
stooge, sap, sucker or “fall guy”.
7 See Vandenbroeck (1987: 45-9) for a more extensive discussion of Fool’s
portraits.
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tegy in early modern portraiture. Far from being simple records of
individual facial features, these portraits represent genuine “envi-
sagements” of the character of the Fool. The prosopographic intensity
of visual description engages spectators in imaginary role-play with
extraordinary imago effects. Considered in semiotic terms, these por-
traits may well exemplify a picaresque “hyper-icon”.8
The “actantional” temper of this ambivalence in roles is evident
in two illustrative examples of Fool’s portraits. The first example (Fig
1), a striking sixteenth-century painting, depicts a squint-eyed fi-
gure of an insolent Fool baring dirty teeth and gums as he messily
eats an egg with his right hand while an animated marotte lewdly
8 Human (1999: 18-21) conjectures that the figure of the Fool in these portraits
should be read as an instance of Mitchell’s (1986: 6) ‘hyper-icons’ or ‘images of
imaging’. In this case the portrait image metaphorically images the
envisagement of a topsy-turvy world or verkeerde wereld as a recurrent topos
governing the picaresque tradition.
Figure 1: Master of the Angerer Portrait (possibly Marx Reichlich), Fool (c 1520).
Oil on panel, 44.5 by 38.7. New Haven: Yale University Art Gallery
(Van den Broeck 1987: 48)
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protrudes from his left. Though less overtly apostrophic in its en-
gagement of the spectator than the Fool’s roguishly gloating eyes, the
puppy on his shoulder, eagerly sniffing for a bite, alludes to the spec-
tator’s role as accomplice or dupe. The next example (Fig 2), a seven-
teenth-century engraving, portrays the costumed Fool as a sly
character winking through the fingers of his right hand, which he
holds in front of his face, with his spectacles in his left hand serving
as an emblem of his sinister point of view. The subscript Unser seind
dreij (“We being three”), together with the supplementary numerals
1 and 2 on the heads of the Fool and his marotte, spells out the visual
point of the portrait. Cast in the role of a third Fool, prospective
spectators are thus included in the irreverent threesome of the title.
The snared position in which they discover themselves mirrors that
of the Fool, imbued with a mixture of collusion, indulgence, amuse-
ment, folly, mortification, chagrin, embarrassment and Schadenfreude.
This has the effect of establishing a complicit but oppositional stance
of “us” and “them”, an inclusive division of “insiders” and “outsiders”
regarding universal folly and precarious wisdom.
Figure 2: Anonymous, Drei Narren — Unser seind dreij. Seventeenth-century
German copperplate engraving, 29 by 21.2 cm. Münich: Private collection.
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Forewarned spectators may well anticipate the rhetorical inver-
sion of the visual role-playing game, and even be ready to counter it.
Yet they are not for this reason “foolproof” or safeguarded from the
picture’s rhetorical effects. Once engaged in the role-play, the specta-
tor has no option but to repeat the collusive performance at each fresh
encounter with the image and to keep on risking the duplicitous
outcome of the role-play. Neither iteration nor outcome is automatic
or involuntary, however, which would result in tedious reduplication.
The spectator may decline the subversive gambit outright, at first
sight, or in revision. Once the rules of the game are accepted, the ap-
propriate reaction is to respond in kind, by playfully resorting to
counter-images or strategies of counter-fabulation. In this respect
interaction with picaresque imagery is similar to the telling of jokes
or to the exchange of proverbs and admonitions in awkward or dead-
locked situations.9
The picaresque “hyper-icon” typically insinuates a sly reversibili-
ty and iterability of role-play into the phrase “an eye for an eye”,
which is in itself a doubling of the palindromic symmetry of the
word “eye”. As a factor of refigurative mimesis, imminent reversal
demands alert spectatorship — a wary recognition of precarious in-
versions and double-dealing envisagements, and a vigilant readiness
to deploy counteracting measures. The “actantional” implicature of
deceptive figures, like those depicted in Fool’s portraits, lures us into
situations of playful entrapment by instigating encounters of a
typically interactive or performative temper. The wily turning of the
tables is in fact carried out by the unsuspecting yet curious beholders
themselves, as a direct result of their enactment of spectating roles
prefigured in the insidious figure and its display rhetoric.10 Extrica-
tion is achieved through sustained attention and adamant iteration in
an astute continuation of the playful battle of wits.
9 Thus Berger (1997: 135-55) seems to suggest that redeeming laughter is only
released in a game of intellect when the abusive tenor of ethnic jokes is relati-
vised by the witty citation of countering jokes.
10 Cf Iser 1989: 236-28 on representation as a performative act, and 249-61 on
the textual play strategies of contesting agon, defamiliarising alea, illusory
mimicry and subversive ilinx.
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Wolfgang Iser (1989: 257) reminds us that
All roles [...] are characterized by an intrinsic doubleness: they
represent something they aim to project, and yet simultaneously
they lack total control over the intended achievement, so that there
is always an element in role-playing that eludes the grasp of the
player.
In his description of various games, each game pattern adds a charac-
teristic cast to the basic indeterminate ambiguity of role-play. One in
particular seems to approximate the typically picaresque gambit:
Ilinx is a play pattern in which the various positions are subverted,
undercut, canceled, or even carnivalized as they are played off
against one another. It aims at bringing out the rear view of the
positions yoked together in the game (Iser 1989: 256).
The play pattern of a game of repeated falling forges an imaginary
world permeated entirely by the protean rhythms of geneticist flux
— a comically topsy-turvy or fatefully reversible world as the topos of
the Fool and his roguish entourage.
In Figure 2, the formal design of the Fool’s hand-and-eye combi-
nation at first sight resembles the scenic shielding and focusing of
the sightseer’s aposcopic vision.11 Yet the display rhetoric in which
the Fool is framed differs sharply from the typically “orientational”
or “adaptational” interface between spectators and scenic pictures.
Apart from idiomatic side-play on the verbal meaning of “seeing
through the fingers”, the partly covered yet brazen-eyed face of the
Fool’s portrait has a curious double-dealing effect. Its masking as
well as its seductive tenor constitute the hyper-iconic core of this
image. Canny spectator interaction with the wily legerdemain of this
cloaked but insolent face enacts a distinctive imaginary cast of envi-
sagement, a prefigurative model repeated countless times as a recur-
rent feature in the picaresque tradition.
Traces of the picaresque hyper-icon can be read, between the lines
as it were, from the individual features of the self-portraits of many
picaresque artists, as is particularly evident in the case of Jan Steen.
Such traces recur in a recent variation on the genre of the Fool’s
11 Cf Van den Berg 1998 & 1999 for discussions of the scenic functions and the
typical pathos formulae of aposcopic vision.
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Figure 3: Stephen Murphy, Self-portrait as a rabbit (1992). Cibacrome print on
board, 40 by 90 cm. London: Saatchi Collection (Kent 1994: 195)
portrait, Self-portrait as a rabbit (Fig 3), a manipulated photographic
image from 1992 by the British artist Stephen Murphy. Roguish
masking is here rendered in a comic version of “morphed” imaging
in the manner of a TV screen with a cuddly soft-toy trademark or a
patently false, Sesame Street-style, commercial logo. The huge bunny
ears play on deceptively innocent references in the recurrent complex
of animal allusions relating to the Fool’s cap, such as the lecherous
rabbit, the dumb donkey, the cunning fox, the wary or cruel wolf.
Yet the knowing glance of the Valentino eyes and the teeth-baring
conman leer of the artist in the guise of a knavish trickster — a self
played and displayed as another — alert streetwise consumers to the
implicit presence of less innocent roles in the background.
Gombrich’s (1969) admonition regarding “the [functional] prio-
rity of context over expression” needs to be reconsidered by rhetorical
theory. The notion of rhetorical intentionality is indeed predicated on
a functional nexus of “contextual” exigencies and “textual” con-
straints. Always susceptible to bias and prejudice, however, such
demarcations are extremely slippery and are therefore targetted by
tricksters and operators. In this regard ideological distortions
typically attain visibility by means of the intervention of framing
differences between the objectives of a display and the objects on
display. The minefield of hidden artifice, deception, craftiness and
promotion that separates a display from the displayed is the special
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Figure 4: Guiseppe Sacco (dates unknown), The eye of a young woman (1844).
Tempera on paperboard, 3.2 by 3.8 cm.
Houston: The Menil Foundation (Hulten 1987: 202)
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province of exhibition curators and critics. In constrast, my focus is
on the unexpected convolutions acted out by spectators while
perusing deceptive images on display. I want to explore two aspects
concerning canny performances of pictorial duplicity — the part
played by the eye in the visual shaping of rhetorical roles and the
notion of recurrent ocular motifs as a typiconic feature in the pica-
resque tradition.
1. Ocular motifs
I first encountered the remarkable oval image of the eye of a young
woman (Fig 4) some ten years ago while investigating the notion of
the implied eye in painting (Van den Berg 1990: 8). My current
topic is explicit depictions of human eyes and the ideological impli-
cations to be drawn from ocular motifs in pictures. Measuring only
3.2 by 3.8 cm, this example of a miniature eye portrait from 1844 is
by a little-known artist, Giuseppe Sacco. It was part of a 1987 exhi-
bition in the Venetian Palazzo Grassi, The Arcimboldo effect, whose
theme was transformations of the face.12 Apart from the reproduction
of the isolated oval image itself, however, the book  published by
Pontus Hulten concurrently with the exhibition is singularly reti-
cent in offering any further information about the painting.
Of late, Sacco’s painting has gained greater prominence, fol-
lowing its reproduction as both the cover illustration and the frontis-
piece of Richard Leppert’s popular textbook of 1996, Art and the
committed eye. The erotic memento is cited as a striking design feature
of a book on “the cultural functions of imagery”. A significant
difference from the representation in the Pontus Hulten book is the
fact that the painting’s frame is included in Leppert’s reproduction.
This apparently constitutes Leppert’s concession to the cultural func-
12 The exhibition was organised “in homage to Alfred H Barr, Jr, who fifty years
ago introduced Giuseppe Arcimboldo into the history of modern art” (Hulten
1987: colophon page). Sacco’s painting had a prominent position, heading the
second part of the book published on the occasion of this exhibition (Hulten
1987: 202) — the section devoted to fragmentary, especially facial, membra
disiecta in modern art, viewed as signs of the abundant Nachleben of an
Arcimboldian heritage.
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tions of imagery — modification of function often being registered
in the framing conditions of images (cf Duro 1996). Like the earlier
book, however, the Leppert text fails to engage the extinct identity
of a picture made to assert the imaginary presence of an absent person
in a whimsical and teasing play with flirtatious revealing and con-
cealing. In fact, neither the painting nor the artist is mentioned at all
in Leppert’s text. The following remarks on the performativity of
ocular motifs are thus inserted into the remarkable discursive void
that frames this painting.
Instinctive display of ocular decoys is a well-known phenomenon
in animal behaviour, for instance as ostensive indices of attraction,
ensnarement or defence (cf Huxley 1990). In terms of the human
face, the eyes are an integral part of human intercourse — the open
and closed face, the changeable yet manifest expressivity of a personal
bodily identity13 as well as the deep ambiguities of human existence
in the chiaroscuro play of glory and suffering.14 Represented in the
13 Being a constituent of the human face, the eyes are essential for “human
eccentricity”, as proposed in Helmuth Plessner’s philosophical anthropology:
“Body surface and voice, the primal sounding boards of expression, have for the
power of ‘faculty’ of expressivity the character of organs of expression. That is,
they appear as means and fields of expression, with and in which it becomes
externally perceptible. In this process, that part of the body which is naturally
outside the range of self-perception, i.e. the face, takes the lead and (with certain
limits) becomes its representative. As the posture of the whole body mirrors in
itself the mental state, so the face — and, again, in a concentrated way, the look
— becomes at once imperceptible and open. He looks out of and sounds forth
from it, and by means of it captures the glances of others, the vistas of the
world. Concealment and overtness make the face the front, the boundary and
mediating surface of one’s own against the other, the inner against the outer”
(Plessner 1970: 44-5).
14 Following Emmanuel Levinas regarding respect for the “face of the other”,
Caputo (1987: 272-73) describes the face of suffering as follows: “We catch a
glimpse momentarily, augenblicklich, in the blink of an eye, of a light in the eye
of the other, which leaves us wondering, puzzled, provoked. It is the ‘face’ as
the most conspicuous point of access, the outermost surface of the body, which
opens the way to the recess, the ‘ground’ of the soul, its most hidden chambers
[...] The face is a shadowy place, a flickering region where we cannot always
trust our eyes [...] there is a lot of what Derrida calls undecidability and
dissemination written all over the face, which is a tricky place, full of
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images of visual culture, ocular motifs are extremely effective in
engaging and activating human powers of “envisagement”.15 Visual
artists exploit their imago potential in projecting imaginary worlds
and fictional characters and in fashioning personal as well as com-
munal identities in the spectators’ ideologically entangled imagina-
tion. Depicted eyes often become centres of image power, sites of en-
visagement where ideological powers are contested and where they
not only attain, in Kaja Silverman’s (1996) memorable phrase, “the
threshold of the visible world”, but where their ethical consequences
unfold and reverberate in the imaginative spaces of human vision.
As metaphors for human vision, for crossing glances and for inter-
locking acts of viewing and discernment, ocular motifs have the “eye-
catching” capacity of extending the contextual reach of images
beyond the physical limits of the picture frame (cf Marin 1993).
With their visual meaning augmented by a number of facial, gestural
or postural pathos formulae, as well as by compositional formations
and framed settings, ocular motifs play a significant part in eliciting
responsive acts of participation by individual beholders, in calling
forth diverse role-playing performances and catalysing consequent
critical negotiations of character and world identities. In this connec-
tion, the phrase “an eye for an eye” succinctly captures the chiasmic
entanglement of vision and world in a Merlieu-Pontian sense, in par-
ambiguous signals and conflicting messages. We speak of something being true
or false ‘on its face’ (super-facium, sur-face), and that means in an entirely
manifest way, with nothing hidden, left behind, concealed. But of course the
human face is anything but that. It is, on the contrary, a hall of mirrors, a play
of reflections, a place of dissemblance and dissimulation, sometimes a place
which we manipulate in order to produce an effect, sometimes a place where the
truth gets out of the bag on us against our will. Sometimes our face betrays us,
and sometimes we give the lie to others by putting on a convincing face. The
human face is anything but simple and unambiguous, anything but just a sur-
face. It is streaked with hidden depths and concealed motives.”
15 In extending Plessner’s and Caputo’s lines of thought into pictorial rhetoric, I
am following remarks by Wolterstorff (1980: 122-50) who proposes the term
“envisagement” for the action of works of art in projecting imaginary worlds.
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ticular the conundrum of ideological motives of envisagement at
stake between the picture and the spectator.
2. Single eyes
Let us first consider the case of the eye in isolation — the denuded
or excised eye as it were (Fig 5). Pictures in the genre of the minia-
ture eye portrait16 depict a single, revered eye as a faceless apparition
in a hazy aura. This suggests a trace of individuality emerging from
misty memory, with the eye’s shape and the iris’s unique colour pat-
tern resembling the singular indexical whorl of a fingerprint as a
unique sign of identity. Fading into the painted surface, the sur-
rounding haze masks the violence of the sharp cut of displacement
that removed the eye from somebody’s face, in preparation for its
dislocation as a transplanted object of display on the body of the car-
rier. Lacking the bodily expressivity of a face and posture, such single
eyes have a strangely impassive appearance — at least to an outsider
Figure 5: Richard Cosway (1742-1821),
Miniature eye portraits of the Prince of Wales and Maria Anna Fitzherbert (ca 1800).
Unknown provenance (Schmidt-Burkhardt 1992: 19)
16 This popular genre of Romantic portraiture, chiefly of British origin, fell into
oblivion at the time of the rise of photography, cf the literature cited on the
subject of “miniature eye portraits” in Schmidt-Burkhardt 1992: 19-45.
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from our century. Evidently, a lover’s commitment and ardent fantasy
are essential in conferring a face on such haloed and hallowed eyes,
and charging them with the momentary erotic presence of an absent
sweetheart — like a Proustian memory involuntarily aroused and
recollected by a fleeting whiff of fading scent from a treasured lock
of hair.
Dating from around 1800, this pair of eyes by the fashionable
British miniaturist Richard Cosway is the earliest known instance of
miniature eye portraits. Moreover, it is linked to this genre’s
founding legend in which the painter had only a minor part (cf Wil-
liamson 1904). The anecdote concerns Mrs Maria Anna Fitzherbert
(the eye on the right), long a favourite of the Prince of Wales, the
future king George IV (the eye on the left). They commissioned Cos-
way to paint portraits of each other’s right eye as an exchange of gifts
between lovers who had already married in secret in 1785. The
legend has it that she surprised the Prince with her gift; his response
was to have his right eye portrayed on a ring for her.
The eye portraits evidently served as public substitutes for mar-
riage vows pledged in secret. The exchange of right eyes replaces the
ceremonial joining of right hands at a non-morganatic marriage,
which was forbidden in their case. Here “an eye for an eye” refers to
an exchange of gifts — giving something of oneself as a public sign
that one gives oneself to another. It denotes an act of commitment
with the power of a vow performed against all odds, repeated in
public on every occasion the lovers wore the eye portraits as part of
their attire. As an Old Testament expression, on the other hand, “an
eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth” is also the most celebrated formu-
lation of the archaic lex talionis. With the purpose of setting limits to
blood feuding, its legalistic formalism imposes an inflexible recipro-
city on the taking of eyes, but also on the giving of eyes, as we know
from Marcel Mauss’s (1969) classical anthropological study on obli-
gatory gift-exchange in archaic societies.17 Such ritualistic sym-
17 On potlatch gifts, cf Thomas Crow’s (1999: 25-50) discussion of Lévi-Strauss’s
La voie des masques (1975) and the masks of the Northwest Coast Kwakiutl.
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metries and iterations are only transcended in a complete surren-
dering of the self.18
In J L Austin’s (1975) speech act theory, legal and ethical trans-
actions such as these supply many of the examples of so-called “per-
formatives” — acts performed by the illocutionary force of verbal
utterances. Mindful of Beneviste’s distinction between the subject of
the enunciation and the subject of the enounced, Derrida’s (1977)
playful critique of Austin launched a rhetorical notion of “performa-
tivity”.19 Instead of subjective acts of reproductive repetition as con-
stitutive sources of meaning, Derrida proposes citationality and itera-
bility as crucial to the production of meaning. His deconstruction of
the logocentrist privileging of speech and presence above writing and
difference also demolished the metaphysical foundations of Western
ocularcentrism that conceive the grounding of human knowledge
and power in the image of subjective vision.20 Caputo (1987: 11-95)
18 Van Leeuwen (1995: 316) cites the legal proverb in the first two lines of another
Old Testament formulation of the lex talionis:
Whoever shed the blood of man,
by man shall his blood be shed;
for in the image of God
has God made man (Genesis 9: 6),
and comments on the striking chiasmic rhyme of the Hebrew dam (blood) and
’adam (man/humankind): “Here the punishment perfectly fits the crime. The
inverted sequence of three words embodies the murderer’s own reversal of for-
tune. What one has done is done to one; the tables are turned.” The dense
poetic saying is not a timeless proposition sanctioning the death penalty. It de-
monstrates instead an instance of what Van Leeuwen calls “proverb perfor-
mance” — the violent loss of life and selfhood as a concrete problem which
generates a wise exchange of sayings in deliberating imperfect human judge-
ments of death for murder. Van Leeuwen measures the responsibility for each
judgement against O’Donovan’s words of wisdom: “Society’s justice will never
be true justice, but always justice and guilt intertwined in a self-renewing cycle
of injury and restitution. Offended society cries out for satisfaction, and is
covered with guilt when it takes it.”
19 Johnson 1980: 52-66; Caputo 1987: 120-52; Butler 1993: 1-23; Slinn 1999.
20 Cf Rowe (1989: 167) on ocularcentrism and human vision as a root metaphor for
Western subjectivism: “The essence of the subiectum, its ‘subjectivity’ consists in
its being a ‘power of perception’, a faculty of sight. Thus the subjectivity of the
modern subject is the consciousness that represents and pictures its object.”
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sees Kierkegaard’s struggle with temporal flux and his rejection of
the metaphysics of Platonic recollection and Hegelian mediation,
reflected in particular in his satirical Die Wiederholung (1843), as a key
source of Derrida’s antimetaphysical position on iterability. Kierke-
gaard (1955) highlights existential repetition’s divergent meanings
in the aesthetic, ethical and religious stages or spheres. The aesthete’s
boredom and the monotony of aesthetic reduplication, ethical con-
stancy in everyday repetitions of the customary, and moral continuity
of the repeated free choices by which the resolute self hopes to consti-
tute itself as a responsible self, are destined for a fall in the absurd
economy and paradoxes of religion. When the individual faces the
abyss, submitting to a law of inwardness and surrendering the self in
a relation with God, true repetition represents the radical transition
from sin to atonement.
The notion of “display performativity” needs to be considered
against this background. It has to incorporate our shared human
commitment in material acts of placing-on-view and of viewing-in-
place as situated reiterations of sets of constitutive and directive
norms that exceed changeable situational exigencies in linking to-
gether separate acts. Hence display rhetoric comprises distinct acts of
imaginative visualisation performed, in turn, by artists, curators and
spectators, each occupying a historically unique position in the “art-
world” as a developing institutional framework. Each act in the series
reiterates and reinforces canons and conventions whose ideological
power is sanctioned by the museum’s “civilizing rituals” (cf Duncan
1995). The modern art museum’s architectural forms, public spaces,
patronage politics, funding stratagems, collecting policies, acquisi-
tion tactics, catalogue discourse, exhibition strategies and installa-
tion practices all silently serve to bolster curatorial authority (cf Bal
1996). Aside from the ample body of writing devoted to the critique
of the system, the discursive void around Sacco’s painting is a tell-
tale sign that this elaborate framework has trouble in accommo-
dating the dislocated eye portrait once it has been transplanted into
the public sphere of museum collections and art exhibitions. The
texts of Hulten and Leppert provide ample evidence that this is a
troubled image, even with exchangeable frames, and even in the case
of copies or reproductions.
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Figure 6: Guiseppe Sacco, The eye of a young woman (1844). Tempera on paperboard,
3.2 by 3.8 cm, in original hinged standing case of leather with velvet lining,
oval shaped gilt detailing, and brass fillets.
Houston: The Menil Foundation (Leppert 1996: frontispiece)
One may conjecture reasons for these difficulties. They may be
due to the sharp excision which removed the disembodied ocular
image from an original face (Fig 5), in effect demanding that public
museum installations do the impossible and construct substitute
framings for the private lover’s keepsake and for lovers’ bodies.
Furthermore, the Sacco eye painting is mounted in a hinged standing
case of leather with velvet lining and oval gilt detailing (Fig 6). The
keepsake has the appearance of a diminutive triptych or devotional
image for private amorous attention, thus engaging a form of cultic
significance at odds with the modern museum’s secular cult of art (cf
Marin 1996). Replacing the hazy ambience that masks the sharp cut
of the ocular image in earlier miniature eye portraits, the cropped
ocular image in the Sacco painting conveys the impression of a face
extending beyond the oval opening, behind the frame. This creates
the voyeur effect of a hidden persona peering through a keyhole-like
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opening into a private space in front of the image. Once vibrantly
alive with the keepsake’s erotic meaning, the afterlife of something
irretrievably lost now protrudes into the museum space where the
melancholic spectator faces it. This effect even seeps into the discur-
sive space of texts illustrated with its printed reproduction.
The foregoing raises questions concerning spectator identity and
display performativity. A keepsake at least requires a “faithful
keeper”, a “restitutionary custodian” rather than a legal owner; some-
body who remembers the person rather than somebody who possesses
the object, and who cossets and fondles it rather than putting it on
public display. Most likely the lover carried the leather case with the
Sacco picture on his person; stood it on his bedside table; undressed
and posed in front of it. The dalliance with an absent mistress has to
be sustained in close and frequent flirtatious dialogue with the pic-
ture’s effect of female presence. Alternatively, the keepsake must be
hidden when entertaining somebody else (a perverse sense of pica-
resque humour would probably imagine the case of a perfidious
lover). One may even conjecture that the frequency of repeated con-
tact with the keepsake might function as an index of the waning or
waxing of his devotion, the proximity or distance, absence or pre-
sence of the mistress.
The bodily, if hidden, presence of the object of the lover’s desire
is effected by the picture’s life-size dimensions and the fact that it has
the appearance of a trompe l’oeil still-life painting of a velvet-lined
leather case with gilt trimming, with a real eye.21 Though small in
size indeed, the keepsake evidently exerted enormous iconic power in
the intimate world of this couple’s erotic bond.
In stark contrast with the diminutive and intimate portrait of a
single eye, the gruesome image of a heart with two eyes in Eye Love
Eye (Fig 7), a huge recent painting by Alain Miller, invades the spaces
of public display with disturbing effects. The eyes animate the dead
and decaying organ in this grisly and overwhelming instance of vio-
lent image cutting and defunct human existence. Due to its upright
21 This reading of the ocular image as a real eye is cued by the triptych framing’s
resemblance to a medieval reliquary, which suggests the kind of display rhetoric
commonly associated with the veneration of holy relics and the remaining body
parts of departed saints (cf Bann 1995).
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Figure 7: Alain Miller, Eye Love Eye (1997). Oil on canvas, 234.9 by 194.9 cm.
London: Saatchi colletion (Art in America 1998, 86(4): 38)
position on a dark background the dissected heart with the two eyes
suggests a monstrous head or a grotesque mask — a stark reminder
of the metaphorical nature of the notion of the heart as the seat of
love, the source of emotion or the centre of personhood. In the pica-
resque tradition such radical literalisation of metaphor is a strategy
that has been favoured by artists since the time of Brueghel.
The single eye of the Sacco painting, on the other hand, has the
representational value of offering a hidden selfhood, a human body
and a personal world to which the passionate lover surrenders himself
without reserve, completely identifying himself with another. Reite-
rating constitutive norms of performativity, this dynamic of “being
oneself” in “being another” truly informs any committed role-
playing act of imaginative envisagement. And far from holding only
in the case of lovers, these norms call for care and solicitude as an
ethical rule of human intercourse, according to Ricoeur (1992). By
interpolating Sacco’s painting into Kierkegaard’s discourse, three
possible ways of responding to the display of the eye portrait may be
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read from the dilemma of the lover in the text of Die Wiederholung —
three eyes whose performativity suggests divergent roles for the
modern art historian. The first is the jaded eye of the modern
aesthete, bored with the repetitive rituals of the devotional image
and the lover’s keepsake. The second is the eye of the moralist, for
whom repetition means “the steadiness of the unbroken vow, the
enduring bond of the lasting marriage, the capacity to find ever new
depths in the familiar and selfsame” (Caputo 1987: 30). Is it too
farfetched to notice in this description of repetition a nascent para-
digm for art historians given to observing the museum’s “civilizing
rituals”, the discipline’s hermeneutic canons or professional ethics?
Thirdly, there is the uncanny religious eye and the radical ques-
tioning of these rituals, the fearful and trembling eye of helpless
humility and atonement for human imagination deceived and misdi-
rected by ideology.22
Monotony, solicitude and atonement are deeply repressed in, if
not entirely absent from the picaresque tradition’s topsy-turvy world
— a hilarious yet deeply troubled imaginary place, a canny and es-
sentially cruel world. This troubling ambiguity is powerfully
demonstrated by the image of a moist and tear-swollen eye in one of
Barbara Kruger’s photo-montage designs, Untitled (Remember me) (Fig
8). Preserving the miniature eye portrait’s keepsake format, the more
than hundredfold enlargement of the ocular motif to an almost
billboard-sized design transports it from the intimate sphere of pri-
vate devotion into the feverish hustle and bustle of the media-satu-
rated public domain. The tearful eye suggests suffering, abuse and re-
sentment but not humility or atonement. The magnified image of a
textured skin surface creates a close-up tactile awareness of the
human body. Lacking the hazy aura of early miniature eye portraits
22 In the Kierkegaardian vision of the religious eye, the true model for the picaresque
tradition’s Fool would be the absurd figure of divine humility, Christ entering
Jerusalem as a king on a donkey and exiting the city wearing a crown of thorns
and carrying a cross. St Paul explains the meaning of the religious paradox in I
Corinthians 1: 27-28: “God chose what is foolish in the world to shame the wise,
God chose what is weak in the world to shame the strong, God chose what is low
and despised in the world, even things that are not, to bring to nothing things that
are, so that no human being might boast in the presence of God”.
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or the Sacco painting’s velvet-lined precious jewel setting, the skin
here is no mere background. It competes with the eye for the specta-
tor’s attention. Hence, in the spectator’s responsive performance,
vision seems to be invaded by the sense of touch, introducing ele-
ments of sensitivity, irritability and resistance which impede the
jaded consumer’s usual facile and precipitate seeing-and-reading of
flashing mass media displays.
Kruger herself calls this rhetorical means of engaging the
spectator’s attention “hailing”. Despite the explicit deictic reference
of the subtitle “Remember me”, the first-person address of the eye is
weak in this design. The moist eye and the skin surface assimilate an
implicit and ambiguous “you”, a silent and invisible address pre-
ceding and following the phrase “Remember me” in the manner of
Spanish exclamation marks. Shifting from second- to third-person
address, it forcefully interpellates an abject audience identity into
subjective spectator responses. Beyond the actual words printed on a
red ground as a verbal plea to “Remember me”, this form of address
Figure 8: Barbara Kruger (b 1945), Untitled (Remember me) (1988).
Photographic silkscreen on vinyl, 480 by 268 cm.
New York: Mary Boone Gallery (Linker 1990: 96)
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might be described in visual terms as a hailing “mega-optic”. Kruger
describes it as
one of the prominent tactics of most public design work, whether it
be advertising, corporate signage, or editorial design. In all this
work, the economy of the overture is central and involves all manner
of shortcuts which wastes not words [sic] (Linker 1990: 14).
Confined to this field of manipulated visual citationality, Kru-
ger’s “quotational qualities” (Linker 1990: 17) lack the radical scope
of Kierkegaardian repetition or Derridean performativity, opting
instead for the subversive practice of Althusserian interpellation and
Foucaultian politics of micro-power.23 Hence, according to Kate
Linker (1990: 17), Kruger’s
appropriation of devices from the media permitted a counter to its
fascinating promises, affording ‘a doubled address, a coupling of the
ingratiation of wishful thinking with the criticality of knowing
better’. Kruger’s distinctive strategy is encapsulated: seduce, then
intercept.
The sting of Kruger’s strategy evidently rehearses the picaresque
dynamics of the Fool’s portrait hyper-icon. What distinguishes a pi-
caresque position among the currently widespread subversive rheto-
rics of cultural critique? A visual comparison demonstrating this
position in action may answer the question. Imagine Sacco’s and
Kruger’s ocular images collated with the two scenes in a sixteenth-
century print by Erhard Schön, Aus, du alter Tor (Fig 9) — pairing
Sacco’s painting with the image of “seductive” vision on the left and
Kruger’s design with the image of “interceptive” vision on the right.
23 This point is well made by Slinn (1999: 70): “[It] has become common in
cultural criticism to pursue a political agenda, usually in terms of what has been
defined as a transformative critique, which aims not only to question the
conditions which sustain existing institutions but to change cultural practice.
While, however, performativity rests upon a constitutive theory of discourse,
thus allowing for the introduction of new meaning, new metaphors which
would shift cultural perception, it does not guarantee or even necessarily offer
social change. Critique needs to be distinguished from subversion. What is
problematic for transformative aims is their desired link between critique
(exposing undesirable assumptions and their means of production) and real
social events, since it cannot be assumed that marking cultural norms will
necessarily lead to consequential action or transformation.”
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The megaphon-like shape of anamorphic distortion fanning out on
the right-hand side may be read as a figure for the “mega-optic” or
interpellative “hailing” effect of Kruger’s images. The pointing
figure of a Fool unveils the vision, inviting spectators to align their
eyes with the arrow on the wall between the two scenes in the Schön
print. The “curious perspective” (cf Gilman 1978) involves a hilari-
ous but cruel exposure of human relations. The trio in the left-hand
scene — a woman with her attention divided between a younger and
an older man, the conventional lover and the cuckold — suddenly
appears in the right-hand scene as naked bodies, reduced to basic co-
pulatory actions, stripped of all social pretence and with the custom-
ary roles reversed. The young man is the target of the shift from
second- to third-person address. In the left-hand scene he faces the
arrow from which the anamorphosis should be viewed, set up to
represent the spectator. In the right-hand scene, however, he finds
himself cast in the role of the “alter Tor” (old simpleton) being shown
the door.
On a greatly amplified scale, Barbara Kruger intercepts spectator
role-play in cultural perception with similar alienating reversals,
with the aim of unsettling gender stereotypes by turning the “in-
siders” of our culture into interpellated “outsiders”. Her interception
unmasks the male gaze as a screening device that secures its power at
the cost of female humanity. The putative first-person address of self-
portraiture also has to contend with the power of this screen, as can
be seen next by moving on from the consideration of single and
isolated eyes to the full face and character.
3. The self-portraying eye
In the photograph Self-portrait with Leica, of 1931 (Fig 10), Ilse Bing
explores self-portraiture’s intrinsic reflexivity of image citation by
posing, in a tight triangular configuration, with her camera and two
mirrors. The photograph itself records an image reflected in a mirror
of indeterminate size, a reflective surface in proxy for us, the specta-
tors24 — the artist being the first in a long line of spectators to face
24 Cf Calligan 1998 on the self pictured by means of a mirror that also stands in
for the eyes of the spectators.
182
Acta Academica 2001: 33(1)
the performativity of the recorded image during its historical life in
visual culture. The small mirror on the left shows the artist’s head in
profile and with her eye apparently aligned with the camera view-
finder. On the right, partly cut off by the picture frame, is a second
and larger view of the photographer — a frontal view of Ilse Bing
with a steadying elbow on the table and her face partly obscured by
the Leica. The strategy of spectator engagement opted for here differs
markedly from the partly covered yet brazen-eyed face of the Fool’s
portrait (Fig 2). Here the uneven folds and shadows of a backdrop
curtain serve as a compositional link between the two views of the
photographer’s face. Positioned slightly beyond the focal depth, the
curtain invokes still-life qualities, being both slightly “behind” and
“on” the picture plane, at once “veiling” and “unveiling” this pic-
ture’s performative transactions with beholders.
Shifting between and combining the profile view and the partly
obscured frontal view, the “beholder’s share” entails the projection of
an imaginary likeness of the artist — the construction of a composite
identity for the photographer cum instrument persona. The conditions
for visualising this identity are laid down in part by the artist herself.
Seeking to control the picture’s spectator engagement and to guide
its envisagement potential, she has selected this particular shot with
Figure 10: Ilse Bing (b1899), Self-portrait with Leica (Paris, 1931).
Photograph. New York: Edwynn Honk Gallery exhibition 26 March - 9 May 1998
(Art in America 1998, 86(4): 16)
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its precisely calculated composition, perhaps rejecting several compa-
rable shots in the production process. Nevertheless, the artist persona
is in part also an imaginative re-creation, an envisagement by others,
by spectators positioned in front of the photograph.
In lending their eyes as the responsive mirroring surface at which
the camera is aimed, spectators tender themselves for imaginative
enactments of the required role-play. They do not look (as we almost
invariably do when facing a photographer) into the fixating camera
lens, situated in this case on the extreme right edge of the picture.
Instead they scan the whole image, continually returning to its focal
points (the measuring eyes of Ilse Bing in their double representa-
tion, frontal and in profile). In due course the spectator notices a
slight disparity between the eye aiming through the camera view
finder on the left and, on the right, the eyes peering over the top of
the Leica in the frontal view. This difference involves a delicate shift
that imparts a sense of temporal adjustment to the envisagement.
The photographic punctum temporis is thus dilated to incorporate the
moments immediately “before” and “after” the shot. Consequently
her hidden act of pressing the shutter remote is read as having taken
place in an imaginary interval, infused with her likeness and in-
jecting a feminine identity, “voice” or “eye” into the pictorial system.
Still, neither her presence nor her actions have created this effect —
it is produced by the spectator’s iterated performance.
Like the Fools in Unser seind dreij (Fig 2) the act of offering “an
eye for an eye” here again has the effect of creating a trio. With Bing,
however, we do not have imaginative assimilation by role reversal.
Instead we have the mirrored registration of difference, read by the
mirroring spectators as a difference of imaginary gender identity
within themselves — identity constructed as a difference of orienta-
tion between us and her persona. The “orientational” interface of pic-
ture and spectator betrays the presence of a scenic framework. This is
confirmed by another Ilse Bing photograph in which mirroring is
exploited as a self-portraiture device, Self-portrait with Metro, of 1936
(Fig 11). Here the image of the photographer with her camera is
reflected in the convex mirror on the right — a micro-scene sus-
pended in the focal point of the bold foreshortening of the scenic per-
spective. This has the projective function of situating the spectator in
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New York, of orientating us as sightseers positioned at an exact spot
within this urban environment, in the shoes of the artist as it were.
Moreover, we are constructed on an ideological level as her fellow
travellers, people who share the same vision of modern urban life.
Beyond the actions of the artist and the spectators the performa-
tivity of craft conditions for image production also contribute to-
wards the formation of personae. The presence of a mirror in a picture,
whether hidden, merely acknowledged or openly flaunted, the mirror
has always been one of the self-portraitist’s basic accoutrements. This
can be extended to various mirroring devices, including mechanical
processes of image iteration or reproduction. Cutting of the image,
citational doubling and transference between images, and the rever-
sal of mirror images are all deeply entrenched in the act of self-
Figure 11: Ilse Bing (b 1899), Self-portrait with Metro (1936).
Photograph. New York: Houk Friedman (Borzello 1998: 142)
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portraiture. An intriguing self-portrait by a little known seven-
teenth-century Dutch artist, Johannes Gumpp, tersely summarises
these issues in a round painting on a square panel (Fig 12).
Using two mirrors like Ilse Bing, Gumpp has arranged an artful
setting in which the image of the artist is in fact tripled.25 Like the
Bing photograph (Fig 10), the painting itself presents an image in a
mirror which stands in for the viewing spectator. Looming large in
25 Cf the discussion of this painting in the context of “the image of the act” in
Stoichita (1997: 245-7), a context that includes a number of early modern
pictures involving the simultaneous presentation of the painter and his work.
Stoichita (1997: 245) describes the mise en scène as follows: “we are indeed in the
presence of production: we are witnessing the making of a painting. The
painter, whom we see from the back, is in the process of painting himself. To
his left there is a mirror; to the right a canvas. The mirror shows us his specular
Figure 12: Johannes Gumpp, Self-portrait (1646). Oil on canvas, 88.5 by 89 cm.
Florence: Uffizi (Asemissen & Schweikhart 1994: xxiii)
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the centre of the picture we thus see the figure of the artist from
behind, at work on a self-portrait. On the left a three-quarter view of
his face is reflected in a polygonal mirror. Visible on the right is the
painter’s hand, holding a brush and resting on a maulstick, as he
works on the rectangular panel of a self-portrait with a matching
three-quarter view of his face. In addition, a cartellino with the artist’s
signature formula (Johannes Gumpp / im 20. Jare 1646) is suspended
from the top to designate this panel as “the painting”.
The specular and the painted images of the artist’s face both face
in the same direction and are ostensibly similar in appearance. Yet
the animosity between a cat and a dog in the lower left- and right-
hand corners strikes a note of discord between the two faces with
which they are paired, the one putatively a mirror reflection and the
other a pictured likeness. As emblems of citational image cutting,
the cat and dog inject a picaresque note of rivalry and duplicity into
the painting. This note is reinforced by the play with geometrical
shapes — the polygonal mirror, the rectangular picture, the round
painting on a square panel — apparently comparing the vertiginous
effort of self-portraiture with the squaring of a circle.
A noteworthy transference has taken place between the two
smaller images within the painting. The scene reflected in the mirror
behind the artist’s back (in other words, the painting as we see it)
would only be visible to the artist in the second, smaller mirror on
the left, the mirror with the artist’s specular image. Yet it is from the
image on the right, the rectangular picture of his face in the paint-
ing, that the distinctive gaze of the self-portraitist meets our eyes.
Here we see him seeing himself looking, looking at himself as an
image; the canvas, his painted image. The painter, whose ‘real’ face remains
unseen, is transposing his resemblance from the mirror to the canvas. His head
is slightly turned toward the left, his brush approaches the canvas. ‘Someone’ is
watching him ‘over his shoulder’ and catching him in the act of painting. He
is painting him while he is painting. This someone is the fictitious author of
the whole painting. ‘Fictitious’, because he is presenting himself as another;
‘author’, because he has left us a painting (that in the Uffizi), which is none
other than Gumpp himself. It is ‘Gumpp’ who claims to be an ‘other’: the one
who is looking ‘over his shoulder’, the ‘Gumpp’ painting the image of himself.”
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image seen by others, seeing his look as it is reflected in a mirroring
surface or in the eyes of the spectator. Due to the image reversal
brought about by the mirror, this second, or right-hand image is in
fact the mirrored face which Gumpp has cited and turned into a pic-
ture by showing his hand and brush at work on it.
The bodily appearance of the artist himself, the dark central
figure seen from behind, is and will also remain unknown. In lieu,
we have the specular image of his face in a mirror and the painted
image of his pictured face to corroborate the resemblance with the
self-portraitist’s invisible face. By presenting himself as another in an
image for others, Gumpp can be said to invoke “an eye for an eye” in
a labyrinthine chain of iterations, each representation being reflected
in the mirroring eyes of an endless succession of spectators.
4. The deceptive self-portrait
An intriguing work dating from 1669, by Johannes van Wycker-
sloot, a little-known seventeenth-century artist, serves as my final
example of picaresque duplicity (Fig 13). Though the title in the
Leipzig catalogue must still be confirmed, I would like to argue that
a picaresque unmasking of fijnschilder pretensions is at issue in this
putative Portrait of Gerard Terboch, the painter of Dutch high society.
The motif of a single eye again offers a point of entry. It is part of the
strange emblematic device, carried in the right hand of the figure of
Terborch like a maschera at a masque, and consisting of a lighted
candle with spectacles affixed to it and a torn scroll of paper spiraling
around it. Drawn on the scroll, a frontal view of a single eye can be
seen in the area between the candle flame and the spectacles. The
scroll is covered in more drawings, a mouth for instance, suggesting
a play on vision and taste. The use of an eye as a symbol for the art
of painting calls to mind one of the most famous examples of the
classical period, Nicholas Poussin’s Louvre Self-portrait of 1650. Here
the eye appears on the diadem adorning the forehead of the female
figure of painting (cf Stoichita 1997: 98-101).
The figure of Terborch has the stance of a self-portraitist. The eyes
in the three-quarter view of the painter’s head direct their self-
examining gaze at the spectator. The positioning of the right hand
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Figure 13: Johannes van Wyckersloot (1643-1683), Portrait of Gerard Terborch [?]
(1669). Oil on canvas, 114 by 91 cm.
Leipzig: Museum für Schönen Künste (Hoechtst Almanach)
with the candle and the left hand with a drumstick are significant in
view of measures taken by posing self-portraitists in order to hide the
artist’s hand and to mask the mirror’s reversal of left and right. Either
hand could have held the brush. Possibly playing on the authority of
Poussin’s example, Van Wyckersloot portrays Terborch as a fijnschil-
der presenting himself in the role of a professional painter’s self-
image, posturing with the authority of a Dutch Poussin. The picture
is completed by the painter’s somber attire and the works of art in
the background — part of a huge Italianate painting of idealised
nude figures on the left and a classical sculptural model on the right.
Van Wyckersloot’s subversive intervention in the iterated rituals
of fame is displayed in the foreground, in the strange still-life details
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visible in the right-hand corner. Where the vain Terborch would be
drumming his own self-importance, the drumskin has been replaced
by a tiny circular painting-within-the-painting. It shows a pica-
resque painter in profile, slyly and obliquely glancing at spectators.
Most likely this is a self-portrait of Van Wyckersloot himself. He
wears an extravagantly costumed headdress; in his left hand he holds
a palette, with his thumb pointing towards Terborch; his right hand
is held at his nose in a rude or disparaging gesture. Displayed on an
easel is the picture he is working on — a painting of a sheep’s head
wearing a Fool’s cap and holding the second drumstick between his
teeth. The posturing fijnschilder painting himself and parading his
own image is likened to the folly of Van Wyckersloot painting a
sheep’s portrait. Surreptitiously displaying a portrait of an artist as if
it were a self-portrait, the picaresque artist repeats the act of portray-
al in a different parodic key. An “eye for an eye” is here quadrupled
— the single emblematic eye of the art of painting, the solemn gaze
of the posing Terborch, Van Wyckersloot’s own sideways glance, and
the laughing eyes of the sheep — a sequence of mounting hilarity
reaching its climax in the eyes of the spectator.
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